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SIMON On  the  ftrst  of September  1999,  the  President  designate  of the 
European Commission, Professor Romano Prodi, invited Mr. Jean-Luc 
Dehaene,  former  Prime  Minister  of  Belgium,  Mr.  Richard  von 
Weizsacker, former President of  the Federal Republic of  Germany and 
Lord Simon of Highbury,  former  chairman of British Petroleum and 
former Minister, to give their views in complete independence, by mid 
October, on the institutional implications of  enlargement in view of  the 
forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference. 
The mandate of  the group was to identify institutional problems which 
needed  to  be  tackled and  to  present  arguments  indicating  why they 
needed  to  be  dealt  with  by the  IGC.  It was  not  to  make  specific 
proposals:  this  will  be  the  task  of the  Member  States  and  of the 
institutions, before and during the IGC. 
The  group  met  several  times  in  September  and  October  under  the 
chairmanship of  Mr. Dehaene. 
It presented its report on October 18th. 
2 1. Introductory Remarks: The Challenge 
1.1 Reform is urgent 
The institutional structure of  the European Union was established in the fifties 
for a Community of  six Member States. It was a very original construction and 
it  has  served Europe well.  It is  largely due to  the  institutions that political, 
social  and  economic  relations  between the  states  and  societies  of Western 
Europe  have  been  fundamentally  transformed  in  a  balanced  and  peaceful 
manner. The basic elements of  this structure must obviously be maintained. 
But there are now clear indications that the system is no  longer working as  it 
should  in  a  Union  of fifteen  members.  The  question  automatically  arises 
whether the institutions, as initially conceived, will be able to serve efficiently 
a Union which may in the foreseeable future extend to 25- 30 or even more 
participants.  Since  the  fifties,  successive  treaties  have  introduced  some 
adaptations  of the  institutional  framework,  but  there  has  been no  effort  at 
comprehensive reform. This is a challenge we will sooner or later have to face. 
Member States are in agreement on this point. When signing the Amsterdam 
treaty  they  accepted  the  necessity,  in  due  course,  of a  comprehensive 
institutional reform enabling  an enlarged Community to  perform efficiently. 
This  agreement  is  embodied  in  a  protocol annexed,  in  Amsterdam,  to  the 
European treaties. 
This protocol envisaged a two step approach: a limited reform before the first 
enlargement,  a comprehensive reform before the  number of Member  States 
exceeded twenty. 
Positive  developments  in  the  accession  process,  since  Amsterdam,  have 
blurred  this  distinction.  Negotiations  are  being  pursued  with  six  candidate 
countries and the Helsinki European Council is  likely to initiate negotiations 
with a further group. This means that the first  enlargement might well bring 
the Union membership  beyond twenty,  and that,  in  any case,  the time  span 
between the first  enlargement and the  second would be  shorter than initially 
projected.  Given  this  evolution,  which  may  well  accelerate  in  the  coming 
months,  the  group concluded that the  spirit of the  Amsterdam protocol, the 
needs of  the institutional system of  the Union and the difficulties inherent in a 
limited agenda implied that an  effort at comprehensive reform should  be 
undertaken right now. There might be no better occasion in fl.tture. 
1.2 Enlargement is Imperative 
There  is  also  agreement  among  Member  States  that  enlargement  is  an 
objective of such political and historical importance, both for the Union and 
candidate  countries,  that  it  cannot  be  delayed  or  postponed  because 
institutional reform is incomplete. The challenge for the present generation of 
European leaders is to attain the fundamental objective of enlargement while 
3 also  resolving,  in  the  same time  frame,  one of its  consequences, namely the 
need for such reform as will enable an enlarged Union to perform effectively. 
The  Cologne  European  Council  considered  that,  in  order  not  to  delay 
enlargement, it was necessary for the forthcoming IGC to be concluded by the 
end of2000. The group has taken that deadline as imperative. 
1.3 The Challenge 
The  challenge  therefore  is  to  identify  those  elements  of reform  that  are 
necessary and to indicate the means whereby they could be addressed in the 
year 2000. 
On the first  point - the elements of reform - the group noted that the three 
issues  identified  at  Cologne  had  implications  or consequences  going  well 
beyond the  apparent  simplicity of their  formulation.  It advises  a  somewhat 
broader agenda, including a reorganisation of  the treaty texts in order to avoid 
constant revisions. 
On the second point- the means to achieve reform- it suggests that, drawing 
on the  lessons  from  Amsterdam,  the  IGC  negotiating  procedure  should  be 
adapted and that the resulting acceleration could, if  the political determination 
was  sufficient,  produce  a  more  substantial  reform  package  within  the 
prescribed deadline. 
1.4 Connecting with the people 
In the  course  of its  work  the  group  has  discussed  the  necessity of more 
simplicity  and  clarity  in  the  governance  of  European  affairs,  more 
transparency,  flexibility  and accountability in the way the institutions work. 
The fact that most Europeans do not understand the working of  our institutions 
must surely be  a problem governments should consider.  This  is  not directly 
linked to  enlargement, though of course the  citizens of new Member States 
will  be  even  more  puzzled  than  those  of Member  States  who  have  lived 
through  half a  century  of European  integration.  We  must  find  ways  of 
connecting or reconnecting to  the people:  why  and  how  the  institutions 
work and to whom they are accountable must be demystified. 
Transparency implies clarity and public understanding of aims and objectives. 
With this in mind the "Millennium Declaration" which the Finnish presidency 
is  preparing  for  the  Helsinki  European  Council  is  significant.  Language 
approved in that declaration might usefully be introduced in a preamble to the 
forthcoming treaty. 
Similarly the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union, which is 
called for by the Cologne  European Council conclusions,  would enhance  in 
public  opinion  the  legitimacy  and  relevance  of the  institutions.  As  the 
European Council indicates the question whether and, if so, how the Charter 
should be integrated into the treaties will have to be considered. 
4 The  reorganisation of the  treaties,  proposed in  this  report,  would,  as  a side 
effect,  contribute to  that  simplicity and clarity which is  needed to  make the 
whole  more  understandable.  Similar  efforts  could  be  made  to  clarify  the 
elaboration of secondary law  and of the budget.  As  a minimum,  negotiators 
should, in the process of institutional reform, keep the important objectives of 
clarity, simplicity and transparency in mind. 
Clarity and public understanding also implies,  in the long term, that Member 
States will have to take a position on the ultimate geographical extension of 
the Union. The Group does not suggest that this should be done now, but the 
problem should not be forgotten. 
5 2. Efficiency of the Institutions 
2.1 Reasons for Change 
It is  a  fact  that the institutional structure of the Union has,  in recent years, 
shown signs of strain. Everyone acknowledges that the Council is not working 
well: sluggish decision making, lengthy debates, lack of  co-ordination between 
too many different Councils,  numerous operational and legislative problems 
sent for decision to the heads of  Government inhibiting their focus on strategic 
leadership. 
The efficiency of the institutional process has also  clearly been hindered by 
the unsatisfactory performance of  the Commission.  Management weaknesses, 
analysed  in  a  controversial  report  by  independent  experts,  have  been 
acknowledged by the Commission 
The  European  Parliament  itself  has  seen  its  powers  increase  through 
successive treaties but is  not making a  commensurate impact,  as  an elected 
assembly should, on public opinion. 
The balance between institutions, which is an essential element of  stability and 
efficiency in the system, is also being put under pressure 
A  significant  increase  in  the number of participants automatically increases 
problems of decision making and management.  Interests are more different, 
discussion  is  slower,  decision  more  difficult,  management  more  complex. 
Problems  in  the  working of the  European institutions  are  already apparent 
today,  and  are  affecting  the  functioning  of the  basic  institutional  triangle: 
Commission,  Council,  and  Parliament.  They  are  bound  to  increase. 
Institutional reform is needed to remedy those problems. 
The necessity of reform,  as  recognised by the treaty of Amsterdam, led the 
Cologne European Council to indicate three issues which clearly need to be 
considered:  size  and composition of the Commission, weighting of votes in 
Council (including re-weighting,  double majority and threshold of qualified 
majority), extension of  majority voting. The group believes that discussion of 
these issues can not be handled in isolation.  Firstly because they cover in fact 
more  topics  than  is  immediately  apparent.  For  example,  extension  of co-
decision with Parliament is generally seen as a democratic consequence of  the 
extension of majority voting.  Secondly because the arguments leading to the 
choice  of these  issues  are  also  valid  in  other  cases.  For  example  the 
Commission  is  obviously  not  the  only  institution  where  the  number  of 
members will create problems. 
The issues identified by the European Council are clearly of  major importance 
but they need to be considered in the context of  a more extensive institutional 
reform. 
6 In a larger and more diverse Union, flexibility in the institutional framework is 
even more important than at present. Enlargement will increase diversity.  This 
does not imply that Member States should be allowed to opt out of  any policy 
they choose:  the  European Union would not survive if Member States were 
allowed to pick and choose among obligations of  the Union. But it does imply 
that, in a more heterogeneous aggregate of  Member States, some will wish to 
go further or faster than others. They will want to build on the Union's agreed 
common policies,  objectives and  achievements.  They will therefore wish to 
pursue  forms  of closer  co-operation  between  themselves.  This  seems  both 
legitimate and indispensable. 
In the absence  of such a possibility,  Member States will tend to co-operate 
outside  the  Union (Schengen)  or outside  the  institutional framework  of the 
Union (Euro  11 ).  Those solutions affect the institutional balance of  the Union 
and they deprive the Member States, and their citizens, of  the democratic and 
judicial guarantees that an institutional framework provides. 
Flexibility  is  in  no  way  directed  against  candidate  countries  and  will  not 
impede  accession.  On  the  contrary  accession  negotiations  might  well  be 
accelerated if,  on some  of the more difficult issues,  closer co-operation was 
effectively a practical option. The principle that flexibility initiatives are open 
to all Member States which fulftl the necessary conditions has always been the 
rule in the European Union. If  necessary, it should be reaffirmed. 
The  efficiency of the representation of the  European institutions in external 
relations needs to be considered and enhanced. For several decades capacity to 
act as a major player on the world stage has been one of the driving forces of 
European integration. The forces of globalisation enhance that aspiration.  An 
enlarged European Union will have, even more than at present, the capacity, 
and hopefully the  will,  to  be  such a major player in  a globalised economy. 
That, indeed, should be one of  its main goals. 
2.2 Proposals 
2.2.1  The Commission 
Since  the  conclusion  of the  Amsterdam  treaty  negotiation,  it  is  implicitly 
agreed that the European Commission will increase in number in parallel with 
successive enlargements. For understandable reasons most Member States do 
not accept the perspective of a Commission in which their country would not 
be represented. But the Commission is not, and must not become, an assembly 
of national delegates.  It is  a European institution of great originality,  which 
has  a  crucial  role  to  play both  in  decision  making  and  in  management.  It 
therefore needs to remain effective, operational and well respected. The group 
considers  that  to  safeguard  these  characteristics  in  a  larger  body,  a 
strengthening  of the  authority  of the  President  and  a  clarification  of the 
individual  responsibility  of Commissioners  is  essential.  These  two  points 
should be  addressed in  the  IGC,  in  addition to the  question of the size  and 
composition of the Commission, which is mentioned in the European Council 
conclusions. 
7 The authority of the President of the Commission has been increased by the 
treaty of  Amsterdam. The group believes that, in order to enable the President 
to cope effectively with an increased membership, it would be advisable to go 
further.  He  should  have  more  effective  influence  in  the  nomination  and 
selection of Commissioners.  He  should be given clear authority to organise, 
co-ordinate and guide the working of  the institution. 
Recent  events  have  raised  the  question  of the  individual  responsibility  of 
Commissioners and of reconciling it  with the collective responsibility of the 
Commission.  President Prodi is  dealing with this  in  an informal manner by 
requesting  in  advance  the  agreement  of Commissioners  to  resign  if he  so 
requires.  The  group  believes  that  this  informal  arrangement  should  be 
formalised in the treaty, so  as to confirm the authority of the President, with 
due  respect for  the collegial character of the  Commission.  This would also 
clarify  the  respective  powers  of Parliament  and  President  regarding  the 
performance and tenure of  Commissioners. 
2.2.2 Qualified Majority Voting 
The need for qualified majority voting to be the rule in an enlarged Union, if 
decision  making  is  to  remain  effective,  is  self-evident.  When unanimity  is 
required, the risk of  blockage increases in due proportion with the number and 
diversity of  participants. On the other hand, the experience of  the Community 
itself shows that qualified majority voting creates a dynamic decision making 
process, leading to consensus, even if  very few votes are effectively taken. 
Extension  of majority  voting  should  obviously  be  applied  to  Community 
affairs (the first pillar) but it is also significant for the other two pillars. 
The three aspects mentioned by the European Council conclusions (extension, 
re-weighting  and  threshold)  are  linked.  Any  solution will  need  to  be  well 
balanced and calculated to enhance the decision-making capacity of  the Union. 
Whenever qualified majority voting applies  in  legislative matters in the first 
pillar,  the  group  believes  that  Parliament  should  have  the  power  of co-
decision.  Extension of qualified majority voting in that field  should therefore 
imply parallel extension of the  co-decision procedure.  This  is  a  democratic 
requirement, well suited to an enlarged and therefore potentially more remote 
Union.  It  would  also  contribute  to  the  desirable  simplification  and 
transparency in the decision-making procedures. 
8 2.2. 3.  Reweighting of  votes 
The  group accepts  that  proximate  enlargement to  a large  number of mostly 
small or medium-sized countries implies that the relative weight of Member 
States  in  the  decision  making  process  should  be  reassessed.  The  issue  is 
politically and symbolically important, but the group feels it has no mandate to 
make specific proposals in this respect. 
2.2.4 The Council 
The  Council  is  at  the  centre of the  decision making  process of the  Union. 
Practically all governments and outside observers acknowledge that it  is  not 
working well and that, if  no change occurs, increased participation is bound to 
further weaken the efficiency of  the institution. Many reform proposals are on 
the table,  including an important one introduced by the Secretary General of 
the  Council  (Trumpf-Piris  report).  Most  of these  proposals,  such  as  a 
significant reduction of the number of Council formations or an effective co-
ordinating mechanism between Councils, do not necessitate any treaty change 
and  the  group  is  convinced that they should be  actively pursued in  parallel 
with the IGC. Nevertheless time may show that treaty amendments are needed 
to  reorganise  the  role  of the  presidency,  for  instance,  or  to  clarify  the 
distinction between the legislative and the executive roles of  the Council. Such 
amendments  could well  contribute to  more efficiency and to  a better public 
understanding of the  working of the  Council.  The possibility of introducing 
them should be left open. 
2.2.5 Parliament 
Article  189 of the treaty establishing the European Community limits to 700 
the number of members of the European Parliament. This effectively protects 
the institution against inflation in numbers as a result of  enlargement. It would 
however be  useful to establish, before the problem becomes acute, a rule on 
how to allocate seats to Member States once the upper limit is reached. 
Proposals made elsewhere in this report imply a development of  the legislative 
role of  Parliament through an extension of  the co-decision procedure. 
Parliament,  like  the  other  institutions  should  also  reconsider  its  working 
methods so as to maximise clarity and transparency. 
2.2.6 Other Institutions 
An  increase  in  the  number  of Member  States  creates  problems  of size, 
organisation  and  efficiency  in  several  institutions.  This  is  the  case,  for 
instance, in the Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors and the Committee of 
Regions.  The  group  does  not  wish  to  examine  separately the  case of each 
institution but believes that Member States should give  due consideration to 
the  suggestions put forward by the  institutions themselves  (for instance,  the 
Court of Justice)  or by independent  committees  (such as  the  Committee of 
9 Independent Experts on the reform of the Commission which has  suggested 
the appointment of  a European Public Prosecutor). 
2.2. 7 External Relations 
The legal situation today is that a focussed representation of  European interest 
in  global negotiations is  only guaranteed when discussions concern trade in 
goods  (for  instance  in  the  Uruguay  Round).  The  legal  capacity  for  the 
Community to  act as  a unit in  other economic and financial  debates on the 
world stage needs to be  established; it  is  a logical consequence of economic 
and financial integration. 
Therefore the question of  external representation of  the Union, in subjects like 
trade in services or international monetary matters, should be revisited in the 
IGC In this context legal personality of  the Union is also an issue. 
2.2.8. Flexibility 
The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced the concept of closer co-operation into 
European law. The group is aware that there has been little time and scope for 
its implementation,  and that it  may be too early to pass judgement on those 
clauses. But the group is also aware that most observers, inside and outside the 
institutions, consider that the treaty clauses are so complex and subject to such 
conditions  and  criteria  that  they  are  unworkable.  Given  the  increased 
importance of institutional flexibility in an enlarged Union, and the fact  that 
they may indeed facilitate  enlargement, the group considers that they should 
be revisited. 
It should be possible to initiate such a co-operation by qualified majority, or 
super qualified majority, without the possibility of  veto by any single Member 
State,  but  with  due  respect  for  the  interests  of non-participants.  Common 
Foreign and  Security policy should  be  included  in  the  scope of closer co-
operation. The process should remain open to all Member States who fulfil the 
necessary conditions. The principle should remain that flexibility is  a way of 
building on and strengthening the Union's achievements, not of loosening the 
ties that bind Member States. 
2.3 Implementation 
Given  the  constraints  of timing,  the  Union  should  draw  conclusions  from 
previous experiences and make a serious effort to accelerate the negotiating 
process. The last IGC was launched by the European Council in Turin on the 
29th of March 1996, the first  draft proposal for treaty modifications appeared 
on the negotiating table nine  months  later (5th.December  1996),  six  months 
after that, the treaty was concluded ( 1  ih.June 1997). 
The group believes that the I.C.G. should start with a draft treaty on the table. 
On  past  experience  this  could  cut  by  half the  length  of the  conference. 
10 Practically  all  the  issues  mentioned  in  this  section  were  discussed  in  the 
Amsterdam  negotiations  and  have  been  the  subject  of extensive  academic 
debate  since  then.  The  Commission,  representing  as  it  does  the  collective 
interest  of the  Union,  has  always  had  the  right  to  make  proposals  to 
intergovernmental conferences.  In the  past the  Commission has,  in  general, 
been cautious  in  exercising  this  right.  However,  given the  urgency and  the 
scope of  the reforms and extensive previous discussion, the group believes that 
the Commission should submit comprehensive and concrete proposals, in the 
form  of a  draft  treaty,  right  at  the  beginning  of the  conference.  In present 
circumstances the Commission has a strong obligation to make full use of its 
right to submit proposals to the Intergovernmental Conference. Obviously the 
Commission would need to work in close contact with other institutions of  the 
Union before formulating those proposals. 
As indicated above, the group is well aware that many of  the problems facing 
the institutions can be settled without treaty changes.  For other problems that 
is not the case and, in view of its mandate, the group's report concentrates on 
these.  But  adaptation  to  enlargement  should  be  seen  as  a  single  task  of 
fundamental  importance,  whether  or  not  it  implies  treaty  change.  Both 
Council and Commission have ongoing procedures oriented towards internal 
reform,  largely  motivated  by  the  perspective  of enlargement.  The  group 
believes  that  the  two  exercises  (IGC  and  reform that  does not imply treaty 
changes) should be conducted in parallel, as part of a single effort, and within 
the same time  frame.  It notes that many changes go  against long established 
practices  and  vested  interests.  In  view  of these  difficulties,  the  European 
Council should give a clear mandate requiring a package of  significant reforms 
which  do  not  imply  treaty change  to  be  agreed  by the  end  of next  year, 
together with the results of the IGC,  so  as to make  a comprehensive reform 
effective. 
11 3.  Reorganisation of treaty texts 
3.1 Reasons for Change 
The group believes that significant change needs to be introduced in the way 
legal texts which are presently in treaty form can, in future, be modified. That 
change  should be  based on a distinction  in  the  nature of the  clauses  in  the 
present treaties. 
For the  past ten or fifteen  years  the  Union has  lived  through a  permanent 
process of treaty modification.  At  any  given  moment  we  have  been either 
preparing or negotiating or ratifYing  treaty changes.  The present situation is 
typical: the treaty of  Amsterdam entered into force on May 1  st.and, on June 4th, 
the Cologne European Council called for a new intergovernmental conference. 
Constant treaty revision is a source of political difficulties in several member 
countries of the present Union. It contributes to the feeling of legal insecurity, 
to the fear of  constant new interventions and progressive centralisation, which, 
rightly or wrongly, is present in significant sectors of  public opinion. It cannot 
be right to pursue this course in an enlarged Union, when each treaty change 
will have to go through 25 or more parliamentary systems with the foreseeable 
delays, frustrations and risks of  complete paralysis. 
3.2 Proposals 
The group suggests that present treaty texts should be divided in two separate 
parts: 
•  The basic treaty would only include the aims, principles and general policy 
orientations,  citizen's  rights  and  the  institutional  framework.  These 
clauses, as  is  the case now, could only be modified unanimously, through 
an  IGC,  with  ratification  by  each  Member  State.  Presumably  such 
modifications would be infrequent. 
•  A separate text (or texts) would include the  other clauses of the present 
treaties,  including those which concern specific policies.  These could be 
modified by a decision of  the Council (acting on the basis of  a new super-
qualified  majority or on unanimity,  depending  on the  subjects)  and  the 
assent of  the European Parliament (eventually with a special majority). 
Such a change would have the following advantages: 
•  greatly reduce the  present need  for  constant modifications of the 
European treaties. 
•  make  the  basic  institutional  structure  more  readable,  more 
understandable and accessible to the public. 
•  introduce a procedure for changes based, at least partly, on a form 
of  majority voting, with intervention of  the European Parliament. 
12 3.3 Implementation 
Important  preliminary work  has  been done  on this  subject,  notably by the 
European University Institute in Florence. Drafts already exist indicating how 
such a division could be operated. The approach indicated by this report would 
therefore  not  cause  undue  delay.  The  Commission  should  mandate  the 
European Institute to finalise  its work, in co-operation with the legal services 
of  the Council, the Commission and Parliament. This would clarify the debate 
and demonstrate the feasibility and the attraction of a reorganisation of treaty 
texts. The IGC, when convened, would then have a concrete proposal to serve 
as basis for negotiation if,  as  the group suggests,  it  decided to go  down that 
road. 
13 4.  Defence 
The mandate of the group is clearly centred on institutional reform, and it has 
therefore abstained from suggestions of a different nature. But the fact is that 
the future I  GC will not be working in a political vacuum. 
The declaration adopted by the European Council in Cologne on strengthening 
the common European policy on security and defence calls for important new 
steps.  It wants the  Council to have  the  ability to  take decisions  on the  full 
range  of conflict  prevention  and  crisis  management.  This  implies  the 
development  of a  capacity  for  autonomous  action  backed  up  by  credible 
military force. The European Council also wants the inclusion in the European 
Union of functions  of the  WEU  The  WEU  as  an  organisation would then 
become redundant. These are major new initiatives, indicating a high level of 
ambition  in  the  European  Council  and  also  with  high  visibility  in  public 
opinion. 
The date fixed for the complete implementation of  this declaration is the same 
as that scheduled for the IGC: the end of2000. 
Given this  coincidence  in  timing,  the  pressing character and the  paramount 
importance of the issue of European defence policy, the group believes that it 
cannot  be  ignored  in  the  forthcoming  IGC.  This  matter  is  of fundamental 
significance  for  the  future  of Europe and the  development of the  European 
Union.  New institutional arrangements will be  needed; they should fit  in the 
single institutional framework of the Union and not lead to the creation of a 
fourth pillar. Article 17 of  the treaty on European Union offers some scope for 
the  integration  of W.E. U  into  the  European  Union  without  treaty change. 
Nevertheless treaty amendments may well be  called for  and should be dealt 
with in the I  GC 
• 
14 Conclusion 
The  forthcoming  Intergovernmental  Conference  should  aim  at  a  comprehensive 
approach to  institutional  reform,  including  a  reorganisation of the  present treaties. 
Firstly  because  the  two  step  approach  envisaged  by  the  protocol  annex  to  the 
Amsterdam  treaty has  been  overtaken  by  the  broadening  and  acceleration  of the 
accession process. Secondly because the issues described in the Cologne conclusions 
have  implications  going  well  beyond  the  specific  subjects  they  describe.  Thirdly 
because no  better moment can be  identified in the foreseeable  future  for  the sort of 
institutional reform that an enlarged Union obviously requires. 
This reform can, and should, be negotiated in the course of  next year, culminating in a 
substantial and comprehensive reform package agreed under the French presidency. 
This may seem a formidable  challenge.  The group believes that it  can be met if the 
negotiating process is  adapted in the light of previous experience, particularly that of 
the negotiation of  the treaty of  Amsterdam. 
As  indicated  in  the  report,  the  group  believes  that  a  draft  proposal  for  treaty 
modifications could be put on the table at the start of  the negotiations. It should draw 
on the discussions which took place in the course of the Amsterdam negotiations and 
on reflections which have been pursued since then, both within the institutions and in 
the  academic  world.  It  should  combine  ambition  and  realism.  On  this  basis,  a 
negotiation  launched  early  in  2000  and  pursued  with  a  high  level  of political 
determination could very well culminate in a substantial reform package by the end of 
the year. 
This  is  indeed  an  ambitious  goal  but  enlargement  is  a  historical  challenge  of 
fundamental importance and serious difficulty,  both for the Union and for candidate 
countries. At this crucial moment in its development the European Union should not 
lower its sights. It should rise to the challenge and formulate ambitions commensurate 
with that challenge. 
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